James on Pure Experience by Krueger, Joel
291
 24 
 James on Pure Experience 
 Joel  Krueger 
 William James’s “pure experience”— developed in his posthumously published  Essays 
in Radical Empiricism ( ERE )— greatly vexed his peers. Many simply did not know 
what to make of it. One reading— which Bertrand Russell adopts when developing 
his own neutral monism— is to see pure experience as a strong  metaphysical thesis 
positing a monistic, all- encompassing “primal stuff  or material in the world, a stuff  of 
which everything is composed.” 1 But James was at best a halfh earted metaphysician; he 
ultimately rejects the epistemic possibility of an Archimedean point beyond experience 
from which we might construct an objective, reality- encompassing system. Moreover, 
he elsewhere seems to contradict this metaphysical reading when he concedes that 
“there appears no universal element of which all things are made” ( ERE , 15). 
 An alternative reading— consistent with James’s lifelong philosophical interest in 
the body, as well as his commitment to radical empiricism, or the idea that “the only 
things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things defi nable in terms 
drawn from experience” 2 — is to see pure experience as a  phenomenological thesis. 
On this reading, pure experience is meant to characterize the fundamental way that 
minds inhabit and relate to their world: namely, not as a detached Cartesian  cogito 
divorced from a world of value- neutral objects, but rather as an embodied  agent 
enmeshed in concrete, value- laden “activity situations.” More specifi cally, “pure 
experience” refers to the prerefl ective phenomenological unity of subject and object 
within the myriad activity situations constitutive of everyday life:  gingerly sipping 
hot coff ee, maneuvering our car through traffi  c, erupting into laughter at a friend’s 
wry comment, intensely practicing our guitar scales, lunging for the bumped wine 
bottle as it teeters off  the table, gently stroking an infant’s forehead as we sing a quiet 
lullaby, and so on. For James, these experiences are “pure” in that, as we enact them, 
dualistic distinctions such as subject- object or mental- physical are not operative. 
Th ere is simply experience- in- action :  an immediate encounter with, and creative 
responsiveness to, the demands of that particular activity situation. Pure experience 
is thus situated within “this immediate fl ux of life which furnishes the material to our 
later refl ection with its conceptual categories” ( ERE , 46). James further insists that no 
“dualism of being represented and representing resides in the [pure] experience  per 
se. . . . Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when 
the experience is ‘taken’; i.e., talked- of, twice, considered along with its two diff ering 
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contexts respectively, by a new retrospective experience” ( ERE , 13). If it is a monistic 
thesis, pure experience is a monism grounded in the embodied dynamics of perception 
and action. 
 Th e philosophical signifi cance of pure experience for James is to remind us that we 
do not fi rst come to know the world via concepts or refl ection— contra the Cartesian 
 cogito — but instead within perception and action. James argues that concepts only 
give us a static and incomplete picture of the world; unlike experience, they cannot 
capture the richness and dynamism of a world continually in- becoming. Additionally, 
concepts— as universal— pass over the particularity and novelty of things and their 
relations. But experience itself preserves this multiplicity. James thus urges that “our 
intelligence cannot wall itself up alive” in logical and conceptual analysis, but must 
instead “at any cost keep on speaking terms with the universe that engendered it”. 3 Th at 
universe is a universe of pure experience. 
 Th is reading of pure experience aligns James with phenomenological thinkers like 
Maurice Merleau- Ponty, who writes similarly that embodied subjects originally emerge 
not from acts of refl ective cognition, but in “a universe of experience, in a milieu which 
is neutral with regard to the substantial distinctions between the organism, thought 
and extension.” 4 
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